to the 1970s, the long moment of the rise of the nation-state as a dominant political form worldwide, while also dropping periodically back into the late nineteenth century, in order to appraise the legacies of the first age of globalization. 9 This is a chronology chosen advisedly and it has significant implications. Ranging from the "Wilsonian Moment" after World War I to the conjuncture of the Helsinki Accords and the twin rise of human rights and neo-liberalism in the 1970s, the chapters tack back and forth across the 'Year Zero' of 1945, nuancing the naturalized binaries historians have balanced on that broad-shouldered year: empire versus the nation-state, (anti)-Fascism versus the Cold War, racial-civilizational hierarchy versus developmentaleconomic hierarchy, and group-based rights claims versus individual rights claims. 10 By doing so we hope to contribute to a wider debate on the periodization of the twentieth century stimulated by the growth of global histories of empire as a political formation, which often end in 1945. We also challenge other chronological patterns, such as Charles S. Maier's influential analysis of the two post war moments of 1918 and 1945 in terms of embedded liberalism, a paradigm still influential in international history and international relations (IR).
11
Indeed, in the neighboring discipline of IR we hope more generally to enrich and refigure the ways in which constructivist, post-structuralist, critical and historically minded IR scholars conceive of international institutions, by providing a bridge to the new international history, one supported by a solid span of case studies. We hope thereby to foster a more sustained and mutually beneficial exchange between the fields. IR scholars of varied theoretical allegiance, from Robert Cox, Martha Finnemore, John Ikenberry, and Thomas Weiss, have long analyzed the ways in which institutions contribute to the construction of international norms and global orders, while debate on the nature of international organizations has regularly divided such noted structural realists as John J. Mearsheimer from such broadly liberal internationalists as Anne-
3
Marie Slaughter. 12 Exponents of more global approaches to IR, meanwhile, have increasingly deployed historical approaches to focus on bloc politics, smaller states and civil society actors, and, as in the case of Amitav Acharya for example, have emphasized the importance of nonWestern theories and regional specificities. 13 The essays below will nourish such approaches, helping to expand and historicize views of the LON and the UN and the ways they shaped the international order. In doing so they bring into focus not just how institutions changed but also how international practices relating to the end of empire, nation-building in the postcolonial world and the creation of rights regimes evolved. As part of this process, many of the chapters draw out specific visions of how institutions worked as negotiated platforms, forums for debate and in some cases, agents themselves. Nathan Kurz's incisive study of petitioning, for example, offers a new interpretation of the international legal system at mid-century 'from below' by positioning the LON and UN athwart locally specific yet internationally resonant strands of political reason.
We thereby invite constructivist IR scholars towards still more granular historicizing of how institutions work and how they effected and continue to effect change in both state policies and As a whole, the chapters that follow construct a multi-scalar, dialogical, and fine-grained historical analysis of the role of international organizations as they shaped and were shaped by political internationalism across the twentieth century. Together they present an exceptionally wide, though far from complete, ensemble of actors, across social hierarchies and racialized geographies, and show how the interactions of those actors tested the limits of the LON and UN as international institutions, and developed internationalism as a variegated practice around the world.
For international historians and students of international relations the consequences of this argument are significant, since they mandate a critical re-engagement with area studies, global history and social history, and with a variety of sources far beyond the holdings of the 7 international organizations themselves. For if the appeal of the LON and UN archives has consisted in their apparent convocation of the world's opinions and petitions under one roof, and perhaps in their translation of that polyglot clamor into English and French, the idea that the overlapping internationalism of the two organizations welled up at the margins quite as much as it was made at the center challenges the epistemological hegemony of those documents. 24 As
Terretta has aptly noted of the new wave of human rights histories -in a manner applicable to the wider historiography on internationalism and international institutions -they have generally excluded "the narrative accounts of grassroots activists in favor of official state documents, UN resolutions, or the letters, speeches, and writings of elected office-holders, UN representatives, and colonial administrators … But how far can we go in examining human rights and decolonization in the Afro-Asian bloc without contextualizing the particular settings in which human rights discourses were invoked?" 25 Meeting this challenge will require international historians to travel further, learn more languages, and above all collaborate more systematically in order to capture the meanings and practices of internationalism at the LON and the UN. 26 This volume takes a step in that direction.
II
Efforts to institutionalize the management of the world order have a history as old as the exercise of imperial power, and the narrower process of institutionalization has frequently been accompanied by the attempts of legislators, national states and varyingly mediated global publics to systematize and contest the wider objectives and meaning of internationalism as a social and cultural force field. 27 From the Magna Carta to the Diet of Worms, and from the Hague Turning to the UN, as preparations began in earnest for a new international organization even before World War II concluded, policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic were keen -as In sum, both the League and the United Nations operated not as unified actors, but rather as 'platforms' for both formalizing and splintering political ideas and international norms, and as laboratories and toolkits of legal and technical procedures, which as Natasha Wheatley has lately shown in the case of Palestinian petitioners to the LON, could then be used to generate new spectrums of negotiation and dissidence with which to return to the fray on the 'platforms' of Geneva and New York.
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III
How did the LON and the UN effect change -and in relation to which forms of global internationalism -during the shift from a world of empires to one of nation-states?
In the first section below, both institutions are viewed as a platform for interaction between states, and as an arena in which international norms were reified and reconstituted through the increasingly representative constituency in the varied LON and UN bodies and the global networks with which those bodies connected. In this way, both institutions served to collate and codify nascent normative practices, for instance around various rights claims, into recognized international norms, or in some cases into international law. This is particularly evident in these chapters, which examine the evolution of ideas and principles such as human rights, as discussed 
